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Abstract
We study the problem of an entrepreneur who faces two investors with private informa-
tion about his project’s proﬁtability. We analyze the entrepreneur’s optimal negotiation
strategy. Importantly, we assume that the entrepreneur derives a private beneﬁt of control
so that he cares not only about expected monetary proﬁts, but also about the probability
to obtain ﬁnancing. We show that if the entrepreneur can shop around with each venture
capitalist’s offer, he obtains high expected monetary proﬁts. If he commits to a period
of exclusive negotiation with one venture capitalist, before opening negotiation with its
competitor, he can increase the probability to obtain ﬁnancing, although the deal terms
are less favorable. For low levels of private beneﬁts, the model predicts that venture cap-
italists’ deal ﬂow is high, but that only the experienced venture capitalist makes proﬁts.
For high levels of private beneﬁts, expected proﬁts increase for the unexperienced venture
capitalist, while the deal ﬂow and expected proﬁts decrease for the experienced venture
capital ﬁrm.
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How should entrepreneurs negotiate with potential ﬁnancial partners? Should they apply
for funding to several venture capitalists simultaneously, raising the possibility to shop
around with each competitor’s offer? Should they initiate exclusive negotiation with one
potential investor, and contact alternative venture capitalists only in case negotiation fails?
What are the consequences of these strategies for venture capitalists’ deal-ﬂow and ex-
pected returns? This paper explores these questions, and derives the optimal negotiation
strategy of entrepreneurs and the subsequent competition in the venture capital industry.
These questions are natural in the context of entrepreneurial ﬁnance, because investment
opportunities lie in private and unknown ﬁrms. Unless revealed by entrepreneurs, po-
tential deals are not known to investors. As a consequence, the effectively competing
investors are those contacted by entrepreneurs. The nature of competition and the corre-
sponding proﬁts of the venture capital industry is, at least partly, driven by the negotiation
strategy adopted by entrepreneurs.
Exclusive negotiations are frequent in large takeover transactions.1 They are also preva-
lent in early stage ﬁnancing, although such practices are harder to quantify in private
investments. For instance, venture capitalists’ term sheets sometimes include exclusive
negotiation periods, whereby entrepreneurs commit not to initiate talks with other poten-
tial ﬁnancial partners during a predetermined period. Also, Hsu (2004) reports that about
two-third of early-stage ﬁrms receive only one offer (but he does not measure the num-
ber of investors an entrepreneur negotiates with). The beneﬁt of exclusive negotiation is
obvious for ﬁnancial partners who are de facto protected from competitive pressure. The
1Boone and Mulherin (2007) estimate that half of major takeover transactions between 1989 and 1999
occurred through private negotiations with a single bidder.
1objective of this paper is to understand why it can also be beneﬁcial for entrepreneurs.
In our model, entrepreneurs’ strategy results from the combination of two assumptions.
Firstly, entrepreneurs value monetary proﬁts, and derive also private beneﬁts from the
realization of their projects. These private beneﬁts can reﬂect entrepreneurs’ satisfaction
to see their idea developed. Alternatively, private beneﬁts can stand for future reputation
gains if the venture succeeds. Success can then increase entrepreneurs’ perceived talent,
and give them access to better job opportunities. The existence of non pecuniary beneﬁts
associated with entrepreneurial ventures has been documented in a survey carried out by
Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1992). In a similar spirit, Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) ﬁnd low monetary returns on entrepreneurial investments,
and interpret these results as evidence of the existence of private beneﬁts. Secondly, ven-
ture capitalists have different levels of experience, that determine their ability to screen
investment projects.2 Possible explanations are that venture capitalists acquire speciﬁc
knowledge from their focus on industrial sectors, geographical areas, or simply from re-
peated investments (see Gompers (1996), Hsu (2004) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005)). As
a consequence, more experienced venture capitalists are able to generate more precise in-
formation and to secure positive expected proﬁts when competing with less experienced
investors. This lowers the expected return that entrepreneurs can obtain when they negoti-
ate with several venture capitalists simultaneously. Because they care also about expected
private beneﬁts, entrepreneurs might choose another fund raising strategy. Our analysis
builds on this fundamental insight.
2There is large empirical evidence that venture capitalists are able to obtain speciﬁc information on their
portfolio investments: see e.g. Sahlman (1988, 1990), Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995), Gompers (1995), or
Kaplan and Strömberg (2004).
2Speciﬁcally, we consider a venture capital industry composed of two potential investors
with different screening ability and an entrepreneur in search of funds. The entrepreneur
can choose one of two negotiation strategies. Either he decides to shop for deals, and
sends his project to the two venture capitalists simultaneously. After observing a signal
on the project’s quality, each competitor sends an offer (reminiscent of the standard term
sheets observed in the industry). The entrepreneur can then reveal offers to competitors,
who subsequently decide whether to maintain their offer or not. The alternative strategy
is when the entrepreneur starts exclusive talks with one venture capitalist. This ﬁrst exclu-
sive negotiation stage can last an inﬁnite number of time periods, and at any time, agents
can move to a second stage of non exclusive negotiation (i.e. by approaching a second
VC). Our results are the following. If the entrepreneur chooses to shop around, a pure-
strategy equilibrium arises whereby the more experienced venture capitalist earns strictly
positive expected proﬁts. With exclusive negotiation, the equilibrium is characterized
by the following feature: The entrepreneur accepts any offer at the exclusive negotiation
stage, and his expected utility is equal to his expected private beneﬁt. It is sustained by the
second venture capitalist’s belief that he is contacted only when the ﬁrst venture capitalist
is pessimistic about the project’s value. Given this belief, if the initial offer is rejected and
non exclusive negotiation takes place, the second venture capitalist does not bid aggres-
sively. This in turn undermines effective competition.
Given the outcome of each generic strategy, we explore what is the optimal choice of the
entrepreneur. When the level of private beneﬁt is low, the entrepreneur cares more about
monetary proﬁts, and prefers to shop for deals. In this environment, each venture capi-
talist’s deal ﬂow is high but only the more experienced venture capitalist obtains positive
proﬁts. As the level of private beneﬁt increases, the entrepreneur cares more about the
3probability to obtain ﬁnancing. In that case, the entrepreneur opts for exclusive talks to
maximize the probability to be ﬁnanced. He then sends his project to the less experienced
venture capitalist ﬁrst. As a consequence, the deal ﬂow of the experienced venture capi-
talist shrinks and so does his expected proﬁt. In contrast, the proﬁt of the less experienced
venture capitalist increases compared to his level when the entrepreneur shops for deals.
At equilibrium, different negotiation regimes emerge according to the level of private
beneﬁt of the entrepreneur. This allows to derive empirical predictions relating the level
of private beneﬁt to offer characteristics. A ﬁrst result of the model is that high private
beneﬁt entrepreneurs should receive less offers than low private beneﬁt entrepreneurs. If
one interprets the level of private beneﬁts as future reputation gains if the venture suc-
ceeds, it is likely that reputation gains are larger for unknown or young entrepreneurs. An
implication of the model is thus that unknown entrepreneurs should receive less offers.
Also, they should obtain worse ﬁnancing conditions, which is consistent with the ﬁnding
that pre-money valuation is lower in single offer deals than in multiple offer deals (Hsu
2004).
Also, the results of the model allow to relate the expected level of experience of VCs
to the number of offers received by entrepreneurs. Hsu (2004) ﬁnds that the average
level of experience of VCs is lower when a single offer is received compared to when
several offers are received by entrepreneurs. Our model offers an explanation to this
phenomenon.
Another implication of the model is that the relative performance of venture capital funds
depends on the nature of competition. Speciﬁcally, when competition is intense, more
experienced venture capitalists should perform better than less experienced venture capi-
talists: This is in line with the ﬁndings of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) that venture capital
4funds performance is persistent. According to our model, this needs not be the case with
exclusive negotiations. In that case, experienced venture capitalists can outperform or
underperform less experienced venture capitalists. A last prediction is thus that the distri-
bution of proﬁts in the venture capital industry varies with the nature of competition.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the related literature. Section 3
describes the model and derives the ﬁrst-best level of investment. Section 4 studies the
outcome of the "shopping around" game, whereby the entrepreneur approaches the two
VCs simultaneously and can show each VC’s offer to his competitor. Section 5 derives the
equilibria of the "exclusive negotiation" game. Section 6 studies the optimal negotiation
strategy of the entrepreneur, and explores the levels of proﬁt and ﬁnancing patterns of the
venture capital industry. Empirical implications of our theoretical results are explored in
section 7. Section 8 discusses the robustness of the results of the model to some changes
in the assumptions. Section 9 concludes and proofs are provided in the appendix.
2 Related literature
Our paper is directly linked to the literature on competition between ﬁnancial interme-
diaries with asymmetric information.3 Our analysis of the game when the entrepreneur
shops for deals is close to the two-stage game analyzed by Broecker (1990). An important
difference is that we study the case where information precision is heterogenous among
investors. One consequence is that the most experienced venture capitalist earns positive
proﬁts (while all intermediaries make zero proﬁts in Broecker (1990)). Another conse-
quence is that investment is efﬁcient in our setting, while it is not necessarily the case in
3See Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990), Thakor (1996), von Thadden (2005), or Hauswald and Marques
(2003) for various models of auctions between informed investors, and Milgrom and Weber (1982) for a
general auction setting.
5Broecker (1990). Other papers study situations of informed investors and focus on the
optimal contract design between investors and entrepreneurs: Inderst and Mueller (2006)
and Peyrache and Quesada (2006) mainly study the case of a monopolistic informed in-
vestor, while Axelson (2007) and Garmaise (2007) study competition. Our assumptions
allow to simplify the derivation of the optimal contract and to endogenize the nature of
competition. A distinctive feature of our analysis is thus that we explicitly determine
whether investors face competitors when making offers. This question is particularly rel-
evant in the venture capital context where new investment opportunities cannot be easily
spotted by venture capitalists.
Our emphasis on the trade-off between exclusive and non exclusive negotiation is also
linked to the auction-negotiation trade-off of Bulow and Klemperer (1996). Our analysis
shares their result that auction (i.e. non exclusive negotiation) maximizes the expected
monetary revenue of the seller (i.e. the entrepreneur). But because the entrepreneur also
enjoys a private beneﬁt, which depends on the probability to obtain ﬁnancing, he some-
times favors exclusive negotiation. An interesting feature of our setting is that although
non-exclusive negotiation is efﬁcient, it is not necessarily preferred by the entrepreneur.
This is because the more experienced venture capitalist is able to capture part of the prof-
its. This induces the entrepreneur to prefer exclusive negotiation when private beneﬁts
are high, because he increases the probability to obtain ﬁnancing. This in turn leads to
inefﬁciently high investment. Hellmann (2007a) studies the optimal negotiation process
chosen by an entrepreneur to obtain resources. The main difference with our analysis is
that Hellmann (2007a) assumes that investors (resource providers) can only be contacted
sequentially, while we consider explicitly the trade-off between non exclusive (simulta-
neous contacts) and exclusive (sequential contacts) negotiation. In this setting, Hellmann
6(2007a) explores the incidence of screening costs on the provision of resources and on
the efﬁciency of the negotiation process. We discuss the assumption of costly screening
in more details in section 8.
In our model, entrepreneurs can perfectly identify potential ﬁnancial partners, and their
matching with a ﬁnancial partner results from their endogenous choice. A somewhat
different view is proposed by the search literature applied to venture capital, where the
probability to encounter a partner depends on a matching technology, and on the relative
supply and demand for venture capital, as explored in Inderst and Mueller (2004). One
result of their analysis is that venture capitalists make higher proﬁts when competition is
not too intense. Relatedly, we highlight the fact that proﬁts are higher for a venture cap-
italist with superior information. Hellmann (2007b) analyzes the incentives of scientists
and ﬁrms to engage in search activities to increase the probability of a match. He shows
in particular how patents affect search intensity on both the scientists’ and the ﬁrms’ side.
We abstract from these issues by assuming that matching occurs with certainty when en-
trepreneurs contact venture capitalists. In other words, ﬁnancial resources and investor’s
time are always available for a new venture.
The current paper is also related to the literature on venture capital ﬁnancing. A major
difference is that we focus on venture capitalists’ screening role, rather than on their
monitoring and value-added activities.4 The fact that some venture capitalists are more
experienced than others has also been largely documented. Papers have explored how
the level of experience of venture capitalists changes their behavior. Bottazzi, Da Rin,
4See Schmidt (2003), Renucci (2008), Repullo and Suarez (2004), or Casamatta (2003) on the advising
role of venture capitalists, and Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990), Hellmann (1998), Dessì (2005) or Cestone
(2006) on the control and monitoring exerted by venture capitalists.
7and Hellmann (2008a, 2008b) ﬁnd that more experienced venture capitalists, and venture
capitalists operating in "better" legal systems are more actively involved in their portfolio
ﬁrms. Experience also affects the decision to syndicate (Lerner (1994), Hopp and Rieder
(2006), Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007), Cestone, Lerner, and White (2007)) or the
decision to exit (Gompers (1996)). None of these studies aims at understanding how
heterogeneity in experience affects the nature of competition in the industry.
3 The model
Investment project and returns
We consider a standard corporate ﬁnance model. An entrepreneur is endowed with a
one-period innovative investment project. Innovative projects generally entail high poten-
tial returns, together with a high level of uncertainty. To capture these features, we make
the following assumptions.
Firstly, the project return is risky. For simplicity, future cash-ﬂows ~ R can take two values,
depending on the state of nature. In case of success, the project generates a cash-ﬂow
R > 0, while in case of failure, the project generates a cash-ﬂow 0. The probability
of success depends on the quality of the project. Projects can be of two quality types:
either good (G) or bad (B). If the project is good, success occurs with probability p. If
the project is bad, the probability of success is zero. This assumption is used to lighten
algebraicexpressionswithoutlossofgenerality. Last, theprojectrequiresaninitialoutlay,
denoted I.
Secondly, there is some uncertainty regarding the true quality of the project. Initially, all
agentssharethesamepriorbeliefthattheprojectisgood, denotedq0. Toﬁtthesituationof
early-stage ﬁnancing, we consider that the project is very unlikely to succeed. Formally,
8the net expected cash-ﬂows conditional on the initial belief of the agents (denoted NPV0)
is negative, and the net expected cash-ﬂows of the G-type project is positive. Assuming
risk-neutral agents, and normalizing the riskless interest rate to zero, this implies:
NPV0  q0pR   I < 0 < pR   I:
The venture capital industry
The entrepreneur is cash-poor, and must raise I from investors. Because NPV0 < 0,
he cannot raise funds from traditional investors, and turns to venture capitalists (denoted
hereafter VCs). Thanks to their experience at ﬁnancing early stage ventures, VCs are
able to (imperfectly) infer the quality of new projects.5 We assume that VCs perform
investment analyses and observe at no cost a signal related to the project’s true quality.6
This signal can be either high (s = H) or low (s = L) and is all the more precise that
the venture capitalist’s expertise  is high. Formally, the signal s observed by a venture
capitalist with expertise  has the following properties:
Pr(s = HjG) = Pr(s = LjB) = ;
where  > 1
2. After observing their signal, VCs update their belief on the project quality
usingBayes’rule. Wedenoteq(s), theposteriorprobabilitythatthequalityoftheproject
is good given that a VC with experience  has observed a signal s, and NPV (s) the
corresponding net present value, conditional on the signal s.
The industry is heterogeneous, with some VCs of type  = e (where e stands for expe-
rienced) and some VCs of type  = u < e  1 (where u stands for unexperienced).
5See Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) for a thorough analysis of the informational content of VC invest-
ment memoranda.
6Our analysis is immune to the introduction of costly signals: We discuss this issue in section 8.
9This assumption captures realistic features of the industry, where some well-known and
reputable venture capital funds compete with newer, less established funds. We assume
that there are two VCs in the economy, one experienced and one unexperienced.7
We specify now the evolution of the project NPV conditional on signals. Firstly, any
VC is sufﬁciently experienced so that the project NPV becomes positive conditional on
observing a high signal. Were this not true, VC screening would be useless. Therefore,
we have:
NPV (He) = q(He)pR   I > NPV (Hu) = q(Hu)pR   I > 0:
Secondly, to focus on the most interesting case, we assume that when screening by two
VCs generates two opposite signals, the experienced VC’s signal determines the sign of
the project NPV. Extending the above notations to two signals, this means:
NPV (He;Lu) = q(He;Lu)pR   I > 0 > NPV (Hu;Le) = q(Hu;Le)pR   I: (1)
From the investors’ point of view, it is therefore optimal to undertake the project if and
only if the experienced VC has observed a high signal.
Entrepreneur’s utility
The entrepreneur derives utility from any ﬁnancial return he receives from his ﬁrm, and
also from running a successful ﬁrm. We thus assume that he enjoys a private beneﬁt B,
if the project succeeds. This assumption is in line with the literature on entrepreneur-
ship, which considers the satisfaction derived from being an entrepreneur as one of the
7For sake of completeness, one could also consider the case of an industry where all VCs have the same
level of -high or low- experience. We discuss this case in section 8 below. We also discuss how results are
affected when more than two VCs exist.
10determinants of entrepreneurship. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1992) document from sur-
vey data the existence of non pecuniary beneﬁts in entrepreneurship. In a similar spirit,
Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) ﬁnd low monetary returns
on entrepreneurial investments, and interpret these results as evidence of the existence of
private beneﬁts. In our setting, the private beneﬁt is only enjoyed in case of success. This
can reﬂect a possible "stigma of failure" incurred by entrepreneurs who do not succeed
(see Landier (2005)), or equivalently the reputation gains enjoyed by the entrepreneur if
the ﬁrm goes on. Quite plausibly these expected future beneﬁts are zero if the ﬁrm fails.




UE = RE(R) + B; in case of success,
UE = RE(0); in case of failure,
where RE( ~ R) denotes the entrepreneur’s return when the project generates a cash-ﬂow
~ R.
Timing of the game
In the remainder of the paper, we study what investment policy can be achieved when sig-
nals are privately observed by VCs, and when entrepreneurs can design their negotiation
strategy. The entrepreneur moves ﬁrst, and chooses either to shop around or to start ex-
clusive talks. The "exclusive talks" strategy means that the entrepreneur approaches one
VC ﬁrst. "Shopping around" means that he approaches the two VCs simultaneously. We
solve the model backward. The next two sections detail the extensive form of each game,
and analyze the outcome of each negotiation strategy. Section 6 determines the optimal
negotiation strategy of the entrepreneur.
114 Shopping around
Under this strategy, the entrepreneur approaches the two VCs simultaneously. We assume
that each VC knows that a competitor has also been contacted. This corresponds to the
view that venture capital is a small world. After being approached, each VC privately
observes a signal on the project quality, and makes an offer to the entrepreneur. In our
setting where the ﬁnal payoff of the project is either R or 0, the choice of the ﬁnancial
contract reduces to a parameter 
, which represents the fraction of the ﬁrm’s equity al-
located to the entrepreneur when the venture capitalist invests I.8 This ﬁnancial contract
measures the post money value I
1 




After receiving offers, the entrepreneur can shop for deals, and show offers to competi-
tors. In turn, each VC has the right to withdraw his offer at any time. This assumption
captures standard industry procedures, whereby VCs propose term sheets that can be used
by entrepreneurs to shop around. Such term sheets are typically non binding (i.e. these
offers can be withdrawn).
Observing competitors’ bids may induce VCs to make counter-offers. We rule out this
possibility and assume instead that VCs commit on deal terms when making their offer.9
Note that in our setting, if VCs can change the content of their offer, as well as withdraw
the offer itself, initial offers are just noise.
More precisely, the game considered is the following:
1. The two VCs privately observe their signal and make non binding offers 
e and 
u.
8Focusing on contracts such that the entrepreneur is paid only in case of success is without loss of
generality because only the expected proﬁt matters for the entrepreneur. All offers giving the same expected
utility to the entrepreneur are equivalent.
9This is equivalent to assuming that VCs make offers before observing their signal, and that they can
withdraw their offer after observing their signal without modify the deal terms. This setting is explored in
Inderst and Mueller (2006) where only one investor has private information.
122. The entrepreneur shows (or not) each VC’s offer to his competitor.
3. Each VC maintains his offer or not.
4. The entrepreneur chooses the most proﬁtable remaining offer.
This setting is reminiscent of the two-stage game analyzed by Broecker (1990) with two
differences: In our case, entrepreneurs can choose not to shop, and VCs have different
expertise. We discuss below how these features modify the equilibrium. Deﬁne i;i 2
fe;ug the probability that V Ci maintains his offer. This probability depends on V Ci’s
signal and bid, and on his competitor’s bid, if observed (we drop the arguments to lighten
notations). A strategy for V Ci is therefore a couple (
i;i), with 
i 2 [0;1] [ ;, the
strategy ; meaning that a VC does not make any offer.
To solve this game, it is useful to deﬁne each VC’s maximum bid, ^ 
u and ^ 
e. It is the
bid such that each VC’s maximum payoff when participating to the game is equal to his
reservation utility. V Cu’s reservation utility is simply zero when not participating. If VCs
remove their offers after observing a low signal (this is indeed an equilibrium strategy
as shown in the appendix), V Cu’s maximum payoff is NPV (Hu), i.e. the project NPV
given that V Cu has observed a high signal. ^ 
u solves:
(1   ^ 





The reservation utility of V Ce is not zero, since the project has a positive value when he
observes a high signal. He can therefore decide to bid 0: In that case, the entrepreneur
13accepts his offer when no other offer was made. ^ 
e thus solves:
(1   ^ 





Lemma 1 The maximum offer of the unexperienced VC is smaller than the maximum
offer of the experienced VC, i.e. ^ 
u < ^ 
e.
Lemma 1 simply reﬂects the informational advantage of V Ce over V Cu. Because V Ce’s
signal is more valuable, he can afford to abandon a larger fraction of the ﬁrm’s equity to
the entrepreneur (equivalently the maximum pre and post money valuation is larger for
the experienced VC than for the unexperienced VC). This result is not straightforward
because of V Ce’s outside option. The latter always has the option not to participate to
negotiations, and invest in projects rejected by V Cu, which reduces his maximum bid as
reﬂected in the right-hand-side of equation (3). The informational effect is larger than the
outside option effect, which explains that ^ 
u < ^ 
e.
As a consequence, V Ce has no incentive to bid more than ^ 
u and we call ^ 
u the compet-
itive bid. If VCs could not observe each other’s offer, V Cu would be reluctant to offer
^ 
u. That would induce V Ce to offer a slightly better bid after observing a high signal,
and V Cu would end up investing in negative NPV projects (i.e. projects that received
su = H and se = L). The entrepreneur’s ability to show offers to competitors alleviates
the winner’s curse for V Cu. In that case, V Cu can offer a competitive bid, and maintain
it only if V Ce offers a lower bid. This induces V Ce to also offer a competitive bid. A
pure-strategy equilibrium arises because V Cu is able to threaten to overbid V Ce in case
the latter offers too low a bid, without suffering from the winner’s curse. This leads to the
following proposition:
14Proposition 1 When the entrepreneur can shop around with competitors’ offers, there




u = ^ 
u, and
such that the entrepreneur shows V Ce’s offer to V Cu. This equilibrium is sustained by
the following probabilities u and e:
i) u(su = H;
e < ^ 
u) = 1 and u(su = H;
e = ^ 
u) = 0
ii) e(se = H) = 1 8
u
iii) u(su = L) = e(se = L) = 0






proﬁt of V Cu is equal to zero.
Proposition 1 implies that the entrepreneur is ﬁnanced by V Ce only, and that he is offered
the maximum bid ^ 
u. This is achieved thanks to the equilibrium strategy of V Cu stated
in condition i): The latter always withdraws his offer, unless V Ce deviates from offering
^ 
u. This induces V Ce to offer ^ 
u for any signal observed, and to maintain his offer if he
observes a high signal (condition ii)). Therefore, V Cu never ﬁnances the entrepreneur
at equilibrium.10 Last, condition iii) states that VCs do not maintain their offer if they
initially observe a low signal, because they attribute a negative NPV to the project.
Proposition 1 relies on the same intuition as in Broecker (1990). The ability of VCs to
observe and withdraw offers alleviates the winner’s curse and allows for pure-strategy
equilibria. Our game has speciﬁc features not explored in Broecker (1990). Firstly, VCs
have different levels of expertise, which allows V Ce to make positive proﬁts, while in
Broecker (1990) all investors obtain zero proﬁts. This captures a natural pattern of the
VC industry, where better VCs obtain better deals (see Hsu (2004)). Secondly, offers are
10That will not be true when the entrepreneur decides to start exclusive talks, as shown in section 5.
Therefore, inexperienced VCs do ﬁnance projects in equilibrium in our model.
15not necessarily public in our setting, because that depends on the entrepreneur’s equilib-
rium strategy. We show that at equilibrium the entrepreneur always shows V Ce’s offer
to V Cu. He does not need to show V Cu’s offer to V Ce though. This is because V Ce’s
strategy to maintain his offer does not depend on his competitor’s offer. Our pure-strategy
equilibrium is therefore not unique, but all pure-strategy equilibria lead to the same out-
come.
Corollary 1 When the entrepreneur decides to shop around, investment is efﬁcient, in
the sense that all positive NPV projects (conditional on all available information) obtain
ﬁnancing.
The proof of corollary 1 is straightforward. Proposition 1 states that the project is ﬁnanced
if and only if V Ce observes a high signal. By condition (1), it is optimal to invest if and
only if se = H.11 Although investment is efﬁcient, the entrepreneur cannot capture the
whole project value because of V Ce’s informational advantage: Competition is therefore
imperfect. We explore in the next section what can be achieved when the entrepreneur
approaches one VC ﬁrst. We denote this strategy " exclusive talks".
5 Exclusive talks
Suppose now that the entrepreneur approaches one VC only. To ease notations, the latter
is denoted V C1, and his signal is s1 2 fH1;L1g.12 We consider a two-stage game. In
the ﬁrst stage, the entrepreneur bargains with V C1. The ﬁrst stage can be divided into an
11The optimal investment policy in our setting maximizes the expected monetary proﬁts only. If one
takes also into account the private beneﬁt of the entrepreneur, the optimal investment policy may change:
if private beneﬁts are large, one may wish to ﬁnance projects which monetary NPV is negative, but which
social NPV is positive. We abstract from these considerations because they do not alter qualitatively our
results.
12Whether V C1 is V Ce or V Cu depends on the optimal choice of the entrepreneur, and is determined at
the end of the section.
16inﬁnite number of time periods t (t = 0;1;2;3;:::;). In each time period, the entrepreneur
or V C1 have the opportunity to move to a second stage by approaching the second VC,
denoted V C2. In that case, the "shopping around" game described in section 4 starts.
The timing is the following. The ﬁrst stage starts when the entrepreneur contacts V C1
and s1 is observed. The second stage starts if one agent terminates exclusivity. More
precisely, if V C1 makes the ﬁrst offer, we have:
1. At t = 0, V C1 makes an offer. The entrepreneur accepts the offer, or terminates
exclusivity, or
2. At t = 1, the entrepreneur makes a counteroffer. V C1 accepts the offer, or termi-
nates exclusivity13, or
3. At t = 2, V C1 makes an offer, and the game continues as deﬁned at t = 0.
A similar alternating offers procedure takes place if the entrepreneur makes the ﬁrst offer
at t = 0. This is similar to a Rubinstein-type model of bargaining in which the en-
trepreneur and V C1 have the option to terminate exclusivity. The original feature of our
modeling is that the value of these exit options is endogenous. It depends on the outcome
of negotiation with the two VCs at the second stage. To determine this outcome, we look
for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which at each stage of the game, the strate-
gies chosen by each agent are optimal given their beliefs, and the beliefs are computed
from these equilibrium strategies using Bayes’ rule.
The payoffs are as follows. If the agents agree on 
1 at time t (t = 0;1;2;3;:::;) then the
entrepreneur obtains tq(H1)p(
1R+B) where  < 1 reﬂects entrepreneur’s impatience
and V C1 gets q(H1)p(1   
1)R   I.14 If they do not reach an agreement because one
13For sake of symmetry, we assume that V C1 can also break exclusivity. Results are unchanged if only
the entrepreneur can approach a competitor.
14We assume that only the entrepreneur is impatient but results do not change if both agents are impatient.
17agent opts out at time t, they both obtain their outside option, i.e. their payoff following
non exclusive negotiations. The key element to deﬁne their outside option payoffs, and
thus the issue of the exclusive talks period, is the belief that V C2 assigns to the event
that V C1 has received a high signal when the game gets to the second (non exclusive
negotiation) stage. Indeed V C2 faces an inference problem: He can be approached either
because the ﬁrst venture capitalist observed a low signal (no negotiation takes place) or
because exclusive negotiation breaks down. Denote  the probability that V C2 assigns to
the event that exclusive negotiation breaks down. The higher , the higher V C2’s belief
that the quality of the project is good. This modiﬁes V C2’ s equilibrium strategy: V C2
bids more aggressively as  approaches 1 when the game reaches the second stage. In
turn, the entrepreneur’s (resp. V C1’s ) outside option payoff increases (resp. decreases)
with . The next propositions characterize the equilibrium values of  and 
1.
Proposition 2 There exists an equilibrium such that V C1 makes an offer when s1 = H
and no offer when s1 = L,  = 0 and 

1 = 0.
When  = 0, an agreement with V C1 occurs at t = 0 and exclusive negotiation succeeds.
V C2 believes that he is approached only when V C1 has received a low signal, and that
he faces no competing bid if he makes an offer. As a consequence, if V C2 is V Ce, his
best response is to offer 
e = 0 (monopoly offer), and if V C2 is V Cu, his best response
is to offer nothing, i.e. 
u = ;. Because of V C2’s best response, V C1 can capture
the project NPV at the second stage. The outside option of the entrepreneur at t = 0
reduces to q(H1)pB and the outside option of V C1 is q(H1)pR  I. In other words, the
entrepreneur and V C1’s outside options are their off the equilibrium path pay-offs given
V C2’s equilibrium belief. At the ﬁrst stage, they both agree on a partition that leaves them
at least their outside option.
Impatience ensures that the decision to accept an offer or to terminate exclusivity is taken at t=0 or t=1 of
the ﬁrst stage.
18Proposition 3 There is no equilibrium such that V C1 makes an offer when s1 = H and
no offer when s1 = L, and such that the entrepreneur terminates exclusivity with positive
probability.
When  > 0, V C2 believes that exclusive negotiation breaks down at t = 0 with positive
probability.15 An equilibrium with  > 0 can only exist if the second signal is valuable
enough so that the surplus shared between V C1 and the entrepreneur is larger at the sec-
ond stage than at the ﬁrst stage. Intuitively, this can only happen if V C2 is V Ce. But, as
illustrated in proposition 1, V Ce is able to capture part of the project surplus thanks to his
informational advantage. We show in the appendix that, because of V Ce’s market power,
the entrepreneur and V C1 always have an incentive to negotiate at the ﬁrst stage. For that
reason, exclusive negotiation never fails in our setting, and equilibria with  > 0 cannot
be sustained.
Propositions 2 and 3 focus on separating equilibria (i.e. such that V C1 makes a dif-
ferent offer when s1 = H and when s1 = L). It is useful to discuss whether pooling
equilibria can also be sustained. Observe ﬁrst that, given that the project initial NPV is
negative, such equilibria cannot be sustained if ﬁrst stage negotiation succeeds with posi-
tive probability. We must therefore have  = 1 in which case the game boils down to the
shopping around game. For that reason, we rule out such equilibria when determining the
entrepreneur’s optimal strategy in section 6.
Proposition 4 Iftheentrepreneurdecidestoinitiateexclusivetalks, healwaysapproaches
V Cu ﬁrst.
The proof of proposition 4 is straightforward. Proposition 2 states that the entrepreneur
accepts the offer 

1 = 0 at the negotiation stage. The second stage occurs only when
15Or at t = 1 if the entrepreneur makes the ﬁrst offer.
19s1 = L. This implies that after observing s2 = H, V C2 offers 0 (monopoly offer) if he
is V Ce, and ; if he is V Cu. To maximize his utility, the entrepreneur thus maximizes the
probability to obtain ﬁnancing. If he approaches V Cu ﬁrst, he is ﬁnanced with probability
Pr(Hu)+Pr(He;Lu) while he is ﬁnanced with probability Pr(He) if he approaches V Ce
ﬁrst.16 See that:
Pr(Hu) + Pr(He;Lu) = Pr(He) + Pr(Hu;Le) > Pr(He):
We conclude this section by exploring the efﬁciency of the investment decision in the
exclusive talks game.
Corollary 2 There is over-investment in the exclusive talks game, in the sense that all
positive NPV projects are ﬁnanced, but some negative NPV projects obtain ﬁnancing.
Corollary 2 follows directly from the proof of Proposition 4. The entrepreneur is ﬁnanced
when either V Cu or V Ce observes a high signal, while it is optimal to ﬁnance projects if
and only if se = H.
Section 4 states that optimal investment can be achieved when the entrepreneur decides
to shop around. This raises the question why the entrepreneur might prefer an inefﬁcient
exclusive negotiation strategy. See that because of the superior information of V Ce, the
entrepreneur cannot grab the total project value in any fund raising strategy. This might
bias his choice towards inefﬁcient outcomes. This question is explored in the next section.
16This result holds because the entrepreneur cares only about his expected private beneﬁt which does not
depend on the VCs level of experience. Section 8 discusses how this result changes if VCs can add value
to the venture.
206 Entrepreneur’s optimal negotiation strategy
In this section, we analyze which negotiation strategy is chosen by the entrepreneur in
equilibrium. To do this, we compare the entrepreneur’s expected utility in both games,
and obtain the following proposition.




Pr(Hu)q(Hu)   Pr(He)q(He) + Pr(Lu;He)q(Lu;He)
(4)
the entrepreneur prefers to shop around. Otherwise, he prefers to engage exclusive talks.
Proposition 5 implies that when the entrepreneur values mostly monetary proﬁts, he
prefers to be able to shop around. The main reason is that the outcome of the shop-
ping around strategy is efﬁcient, while that of exclusive talks is not. The value of funded
projects is larger and the entrepreneur obtains a sufﬁciently large fraction of it to prefer
the most efﬁcient strategy. The important result is when the entrepreneur’s private beneﬁt
becomes large. Then the entrepreneur’s choice is biased towards the strategy that maxi-
mizes the probability to obtain funding, namely exclusive talks. This is the case because
competition between VCs is imperfect, so that the entrepreneur does not capture the full
project value. If he decides to shop around, the entrepreneur’s project is funded with prob-
ability Pr(He), while it is funded with probability Pr(He) + Pr(Hu;Le) with exclusive
negotiation (see Corollary 2). When B increases, the entrepreneur is willing to abandon
a fraction of the project’s cash-ﬂows to increase his expected private beneﬁt.
We explore below how the optimal negotiation strategy of the entrepreneur affects the
deal ﬂow and proﬁtability of the VC industry.
Proposition 6 When B is low in the sense that condition (4) holds, the deal ﬂow of the
two VCs is large, and only V Ce earns positive expected proﬁts. As B increases in the
21sense that condition (4) does not hold any more, the level of expected proﬁts of V Cu
increases, while that of V Ce decreases. Also, V Ce’s deal ﬂow decreases.
Clearly, the two VCs are not indifferent to the entrepreneur’s strategy choice. Because
of his informational advantage, V Ce strictly prefers that the entrepreneur shops around:
In equilibrium only he ﬁnances projects. With exclusive talks, V Ce only receives deals
that have been rejected by his competitor, which lowers his deal ﬂow and his expected
proﬁt. At the opposite, V Cu strictly prefers exclusive talks, because he can offer deals
without suffering from the winner’s curse. An interesting result is that even though V Cu’s
signal is redundant, V Cu ﬁnances projects in equilibrium (when negotiation occurs). This
explains why different types of VCs co-exist in the industry.
Proposition 6 also suggests that different types of VCs potentially attract different types
of entrepreneurs. Low-private beneﬁt entrepreneurs send their projects to both inexperi-
enced and experienced VCs, while high-private beneﬁt entrepreneurs favor less experi-
enced VCs.
7 Empirical predictions
Our focus on the entrepreneur’s optimal negotiation strategy allows to derive unique em-
pirical predictions regarding the number of offers received, the characteristics of the deals
proposed by VCs, as well as the equilibrium performance of different VCs. We confront
below these predictions to existing evidence and provide additional tests of our theoretical
framework.
The ﬁrst set of empirical predictions relates the level of private beneﬁts of entrepreneurs
to deal characteristics such as the number of offers received, or the venture valuation ob-
tained. The model predicts that when B is low, the entrepreneur optimally chooses to
22shop around, while he prefers exclusive negotiation when B is high. We thus expect the
number of offers received to be smaller when entrepreneurs’ private beneﬁt is high. To
assess the relevance of this result, the empirical challenge is to measure the level of private
beneﬁt of entrepreneurs. One possibility is to interpret private beneﬁts as future reputa-
tion gains if the venture succeeds. Success makes entrepreneurs more visible, increases
their perceived talent, and expands the set of future job opportunities.17 Reputation gains
are likely to be higher for young entrepreneurs with no track record or media coverage.
An implication of the model is that young or unknown entrepreneurs (as measured by
their media coverage for instance) are more likely to engage in exclusive negotiation and
receive only one offer. A related implication of this result is that high private beneﬁt en-
trepreneurs should obtain worse ﬁnancing conditions (i.e. a lower price) than low private
beneﬁt entrepreneurs. Consistent with the above prediction, Hsu (2004) documents that
pre-money valuations are signiﬁcantly lower in single offer deals than in multiple offer
deals. However, the link between the level of private beneﬁts and the price obtained by
entrepreneurs has, to our knowledge, not been tested.
Second, the model allows to relate the number of offers received by entrepreneurs to
the expected level of experience of VCs offering deals. Hsu (2004) ﬁnds that the average
levelofexperienceofVCsissigniﬁcantlylowerwhenentrepreneursreceiveasingleoffer,
compared to when they receive several offers. To measure the average level of experience,
Hsu (2004) attributes the value zero to VCs below the median level of experience of their
industry, and the value one to VCs above the median. Our model predicts that the average
level of experience when a single offer is received is: Pr(Hu)u + Pr(He;Lu)e while it
is u+e
2 when two offers are received. Following Hsu’s characterization of experience, and
attributing the value 0 to offers stemming from V Cu and 1 to offers stemming from V Ce,
17Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2010) document that CEO pay includes a talent premium.
23our model is consistent with Hsu’s observation if Pr(He;Lu) < 1
2. This is always the
case when q0 < 1
2, which is very likely for innovative projects.18
Last, for each negotiation strategy, our results predict that the relative ﬁnancial perfor-
mance of more and less experienced funds varies, because their ﬁnancial offers and selec-
tion strategy vary. Proposition 6 states that the expected proﬁt of experienced (resp. less
experienced) VCs decreases (resp. increases) when private beneﬁts increase. It is not easy
though to observe the performance of a single fund over different market environments,
usuallybecauseventurecapitalfundsoperateinspecializedmarketsandgeographicareas.
To provide testable predictions of these results, we need to assess the relative performance
of each fund, in each competitive regime. Also, empirical evidence on the performance
of venture capital funds usually measures the proﬁtability of the realized investments. We
thus need to compute VCs expected proﬁts, conditional on ﬁnancing taking place. The
next proposition summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 7 In the shopping around strategy, V Ce earns higher proﬁt on investment
than V Cu. In the exclusive talks strategy, V Ce’s proﬁt on investment can be larger or
smaller than V Cu’s.
The intuition of proposition 7 is the following. Only V Ce earns positive expected proﬁt if
both VCs compete to ﬁnance the entrepreneur. As a consequence, the proﬁt on investment
is nul for V Cu, and positive for V Ce. Things are more complicated under exclusive
talks, because the two VCs earn positive expected proﬁts. The relative proﬁtability of
the two VCs depends on two elements. On the one hand, V Cu has the advantage to
play ﬁrst, and to ﬁnance all projects for which he receives a high signal. On the other
hand, V Ce has a better screening ability, which may increase his proﬁtability. Our model
18Bergemann, Hege, and Peng (2009) estimate that the failure rate of US venture capital investments is
closeto60%. GiventhescreeningprocessofVCinvestments, theexanteprobabilityoffailureofinnovative
projects is much above 60%.
24thus predicts that more experienced VCs perform better when competition is intense, and
private beneﬁts are low, while this needs not be the case when competition is less severe.
These results speak to the empirical ﬁndings of Kaplan and Schoar (2005), and Hege et
al. (2006). While the former document some persistence in VC funds performance in the
US, suggesting that more experienced or skilled VCs are able to generate larger returns,
Hege et al. (2006) suggest that US VCs do not outperform European VCs when investing
in European deals. Our model can reconcile the two by showing that experience alone
cannot explain proﬁtability: One needs to consider also the nature of competition.19
8 Robustness
We assume that the project has a positive NPV conditional on se = H and negative oth-
erwise. This gives a strong informational advantage to the experienced VC. Consider
instead that the project has a positive NPV conditional on any high signal. This implies
that NPV0 > 0, which reduces the winner’s curse of the less experienced VC. This mod-
iﬁes the shopping around equilibrium, by inducing V Cu not to always withdraw his offer
after observing a high signal. It is easy to show that for some parameter values, it can
also lead both VCs to earn strictly positive expected proﬁts. An important consequence
is that the entrepreneur now has no incentive to engage in exclusive talks, because this
strategy cannot increase his probability to obtain ﬁnancing. The result of Bulow and
Klemperer (1996) that competition leads to higher proﬁts for the entrepreneur then ap-
plies. However, the assumption that the initial project NPV is positive does not ﬁt well
the situation of early-stage ﬁnancing where a large fraction of ventures ultimately fail. In
19An alternative explanation to reconcile these two results is that US VCs are better at investing at home
than abroad. This effect has been documented for analysts by Malloy (2005). Note however that if geog-
raphy is the only determinant of performance, european VCs should perform better at home than their US
counterparts for the same level of experience.
25these industries, we expect exclusive talks to occur more frequently.
In the model, there is exactly one experienced and one unexperienced VC. If we allow
for more than two VCs, the results depend on whether there still exists one VC with su-
perior information compared to the others. If this is still the case (for instance, if there
is one experienced, and several unexperienced VCs), the results are unchanged: Only the
experienced VC makes positive proﬁts when the entrepreneur shops around and exclu-
sive negotiation still increases the probability for the entrepreneur to obtain ﬁnancing. If
however several experienced VCs are active on the market, their proﬁts fall down to zero
when they all compete for ﬁnancing, as shown by Broecker (1990). With homogenous
VCs, the efﬁcient investment policy is to ﬁnance a project if and only if sufﬁciently many
high signals are observed.20 It can thus still be the case that the entrepreneur prefers ex-
clusive talks that leads to inefﬁciently too many projects ﬁnanced when his private beneﬁt
is high. The main difference with our analysis relies on the level of proﬁts achieved by
VCs in the economy, and on the corresponding empirical predictions.
If we introduce a cost to generate each VC’s signal, the results of the model are qualita-
tively unchanged but VCs’ strategies in the shopping around game are modiﬁed. To en-
sure participation of all VCs and thus the existence of an equilibrium, the unexperienced
VC has to make positive expected proﬁts. We can construct a mixed strategy equilibrium
(see Milgrom and Weber (1983), von Thadden (2004) or Hauswald and Marquez (2003))
such that the experienced VC makes a monopoly offer with a positive probability and the
unexperienced VC provides ﬁnancing with positive probability. In this equilibrium, both
VCs make positive proﬁts, and a costly signal does not impede their participation (pro-
vided that the cost is not too high). In the exclusive talks game, both VCs make positive
proﬁts: They agree to participate if obtaining a signal is (not too) costly.
20Therefore, observing one high signal is not sufﬁcient to ensure that a project has a positive NPV.
26Last, the result of proposition 4 (that the entrepreneur commits to exclusive talks with
the unexperienced VC) relies on the assumption that the experienced VC does not add
value to the venture. If we instead assume that the level of experience of VCs modiﬁes
the level of private beneﬁt of the entrepreneur,21 the entrepreneur’s decision results from a
new trade-off. By approaching the unexperienced VC ﬁrst, the entrepreneur increases the
probability to obtain ﬁnancing. But by approaching the experienced VC ﬁrst, he increases
his private beneﬁt. When the latter effect dominates, the entrepreneur negotiates with
V Ce ﬁrst. But see that this rules out equilibria with exclusive talks. Indeed, by shopping
around, the entrepreneur captures a larger fraction of the expected cash-ﬂows and obtains




In this paper, we investigate how competition takes place in the venture capital indus-
try, emanating from entrepreneurs’ negotiation strategy. We consider a model whereby
a cash-poor entrepreneur proposes an investment project to venture capitalists. We com-
pare the utility that the entrepreneur can obtain when he proposes his project to two VCs
at the same time and when he starts exclusive negotiations with one VC only. Some im-
portant assumptions drive the results of the model. Firstly, venture capitalists are able to
extract private information on the true value of the project, which constitutes an infor-
mational advantage when dealing with the entrepreneur. To feature in a realistic way the
heterogeneity in the venture capital industry, we assume that VCs have different signal
21For instance, more experienced VCs can more easily introduce new partners in the future, thereby
increasing the continuation value of the venture, as suggested in Hsu (2004).
27precisions, which make them more or less vulnerable when competing with each other.
As a consequence, their equilibrium strategies and expected proﬁts are different. Sec-
ondly, the entrepreneur enjoys non monetary beneﬁts when his project is implemented.
When deciding his optimal negotiation strategy, he cares not only about his expected
monetary proﬁts, but also about his expected private beneﬁts. This affects the efﬁciency
of the investment decision, and the performance of the industry.
One insight of the model is that the entrepreneur can hardly use the threat of competition
to extract proﬁt when negotiating with one VC only. Indeed, the entrepreneur’s outside
option when engaging in exclusive negotiation depends on the subsequent VC’s beliefs
about why he is approached. This inference problem gives rise to an equilibrium in which
the entrepreneur cannot capture any monetary proﬁt when engaging in exclusive nego-
tiation. When his private beneﬁt is large, he may still prefer the exclusive negotiation
strategy because it leads to (inefﬁciently) too many projects ﬁnanced: The probability to
obtain ﬁnancing is thus larger than in the case where the entrepreneur initiates talks with
both VCs. Therefore, the optimal negotiation strategy of the entrepreneur depends on his
level of private beneﬁt. This has consequences for both the deal ﬂow and performance
of the venture capital industry. When the entrepreneur’s private beneﬁt is small, all VCs
experience a high deal ﬂow, and only the experienced VC makes positive expected prof-
its. When the private beneﬁt is large, the entrepreneur prefers to start negotiating with
the unexperienced VC ﬁrst. This raises the latter’s expected proﬁt, and reduces both the
deal ﬂow and the expected proﬁt of the experienced VC. Finally, this strategy reduces
efﬁciency in the sense that some inefﬁcient projects are ﬁnanced.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Let us prove that ^ 
e > ^ 


















Using (6) and (7) into (5) yields:
e(I   q0pR)u + I(1   q0) > I(1   q0)u: (8)
Condition (8) is always true since e > u and NPV0 < 0 hence ^ 
e > ^ 
u.

Proof of proposition 1
Denote u (resp. e) the probability that V Cu (resp. V Ce) maintains his offer. Deﬁne  2 [0;1]
theprobabilitythatV Cu’sofferischosenwhenV Ce makesthesameoffer. Considerthefollowing
equilibrium candidate:
 V Cu proposes ^ 
u and always withdraws his offer, unless the entrepreneur shows him an
offer 
e < ^ 
u.
 V Ce proposes ^ 
u and withdraws his offer if and only if se = L.
29 The entrepreneur always shows V Ce’s offer to V Cu.
Given the players’ strategy, V Cu has no incentive to deviate. He makes negative expected proﬁts
if he maintains his offer after su = L. He makes negative proﬁts if he maintains his offer after
su = H when 
e = ^ 
u if  < 1, and he is indifferent if  = 1.
V Ce has no incentive to deviate either. If he proposes 
e < ^ 














Pr(LujHe)[q(He;Lu)pR   I] since ^ 
u < ^ 
e.
Last, the entrepreneur is indifferent between showing V Ce’s offer or not, when 
e = ^ 
u. He then
shows it in equilibrium.

Proof of proposition 2
Consider the equilibrium candidate in which  = 0 and V C1, whatever his level of experience,
plays 
1 = ; if s1 = L, and 
1 = 0 if s1 = H.
We know from the Rubinstein’s model (see for instance Muthoo (99)) that in the negotiation model
with outside options, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in which agreement
is reached at time 0. In equilibrium, the negotiations do not break down in disagreement and
players do not take up their outside option, which implies  = 0. However, the presence of
outside options do inﬂuence the equilibrium partition: each player cannot obtain more than his
outside option at the negotiation stage. Also, the SPE does not depend on which player makes the
ﬁrst offer at time 0.
Let us now determine the outside option payoffs when  = 0: V C2 believes that any offer by
V C1 is accepted by the entrepreneur. If V C2 is contacted at the second stage of the game, his
30equilibrium belief is thus that s1 = L. Given his belief, he plays 
2 = ; if s2 = L, and, if
s2 = H, he plays 
2 = ; if V C2 is V Cu, or 
2 = 0 if he is V Ce. At the second stage, V C1’s
optimal response is to offer 
1 =  (if he is V Cu) or 0 (if he is V Ce). The outside option payoff
of the entrepreneur then reduces to q(H1)pB (if V C1 is V Ce) or q(H1)(pB + R) (if V C1
is V Cu). V C1 obtains NPV (H1) if he is experienced and q(H1)p(1   )R   I if he is less
experienced.
TheuniqueSPEshareobtainedbyV C1 convergestoNPV (H1)andtheentrepreneuronlyobtains
his private beneﬁt q(H1)pB. At equilibrium, this translates into 
1 = 0.

Proof of proposition 3
Consider the equilibrium candidate in which  > 0 and V C1 plays 
1 = ; if s1 = L and 
1  0
if s1 = H.
A necessary condition to sustain an equilibrium with  > 0 is that it is an equilibrium strategy
to reject any proﬁtable offer of the other party. By proﬁtable, we mean any offer that gives the
other party at least the same expected payoff as that obtained if the offer is rejected and the second
stage occurs. A necessary condition is thus that the joint surplus that the entrepreneur and V C1 can
share at the exclusive negotiation stage is smaller than their joint surplus if the second stage occurs.
Were this not true, one party could make an offer such that she is indifferent between seeing her
offer accepted, or rejected (and the second stage occurring). Then the other party would always
prefer to accept the offer (by assumption, if the joint surplus of the two parties is larger at the ﬁrst
stage than at the second, and if one party makes an offer such that she is indifferent, the other
party strictly gains by accepting the offer). We show below that this necessary condition can not
be satisﬁed and thus that there is no equilibrium in which the entrepreneur rejects V Ce’s offer
with probability  > 0.
1) Assume that the entrepreneur contacts V Ce ﬁrst. The maximum feasible bid of V Cu now
31depends on . The higher , the more conﬁdent V Cu is about the project quality and the higher
his competitive bid is. Denote q(Hu;) the probability that the quality of the project is good given
that V Cu has observed a high signal and given V Cu’s belief  > 0. We have:
q(Hu;) =
q0u(e + (1   e))





q(Hu;) is increasing with . This implies that ^ 
u() < ^ 
e 8.
If the game reaches the second stage, the strategy of V Cu is to propose ^ 
u() and withdraw his
offer unless he observes su = H, and the entrepreneur shows him an offer 
e < ^ 
u(). Else,
V Cu makes negative expected proﬁts. The strategy of V Ce is then to propose 
e = ^ 
u() and
maintain it if se = H. Given V Cu’s strategy, V Ce has no incentive to deviate. If he deviates and
announce 
e < ^ 
u(), his expected proﬁt is: Pr(LujHe)[q(He;Lu)pR   I], which is lower than







ThesurplusthattheentrepreneurandV Ce canshareatthesecondstageisthus((q(He)p(^ 
u()R+
B))+(1 ^ 
u())q(He)pR I). See that this surplus is strictly lower than the surplus that the en-
trepreneur and V Ce can share at the ﬁrst stage (q(He)p(R+B) I) because  < 1. This implies
that V Ce can always propose 
e such that he and the entrepreneur are both better off negotiating
than going to the second stage. The equilibrium candidate in which  > 0 does not exist.
2) Assume that the entrepreneur contacts V Cu ﬁrst. Again, the competitive bid of V Ce depends
on : V Ce bids more aggressively as  approaches 1. When V Ce believes that V Cu’s offer is
rejected with probability , his maximum bid is deﬁned as follows:
^ 
e() =
NPV (He;)   Pr(LujHe;)(q(He;Lu;)pR   I)
q(He;)pR
; (9)
and is increasing with . ^ 
e() can then be larger or smaller than the competitive bid of V Cu when
 < 1.
Consider ﬁrst the values of  such that ^ 
u  ^ 
e(). The strategies of the two VCs at the second
32stage are those deﬁned in proposition 1. The strategy of V Cu is to propose ^ 
u and withdraw his
offer unless the V Ce shows him an offer 
e < ^ 
u (and su = H). V Ce then announces 
e = ^ 
u
and maintains it if se = H.
The expected utility of the entrepreneur if he terminates exclusive negotiation is thus
E(UE) = Pr(HejHu)q(He;Hu)p(^ 
uR + B):
ThejointproﬁtthatV Cu andtheentrepreneurcanshareunderexclusivenegotiationisq(Hu)p(R+
B)   I. See that
Pr(HejHu)q(He;Hu)p(^ 
uR + B) < q(Hu)p(R + B)   I
which reduces to
Pr(HejHu)q(He;Hu) < q(Hu) , e < 1; (10)
which is always true. The equilibrium candidate in which  > 0 and ^ 
u  ^ 
e() does not exist.
Consider next the values of  such that ^ 
u > ^ 
e(). We know that V Ce does not want to bid
until ^ 
u since he can obtain a strictly higher expected payoff by bidding 0 each time he receives
a high signal. This implies that V Cu never bids above ^ 
e(), and that he also earns positive
expected proﬁts. The equilibrium pure strategies deﬁned in proposition 1 cannot constitute an
equilibrium anymore. There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium (see Milgrom and Weber (1983),
von Thadden (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2003)) in which, when V Ce receives a high
signal, with probability xe(), he randomizes according to a continuous distribution Fe(
) on
[0; ^ 
e()] and, with probability (1   xe()), he plays 

e = 0. When V Cu receives a high signal,
he randomizes according to a continuous distribution Fu(
) on [0; ^ 
e()]. The expected proﬁt of
V Ce is strictly positive and equal to Pr(LujHe;)(q(He;Lu)pR   I). The expected proﬁt of
V Cu is also positive and equal to ((1   ^ 
e())q(Hu)pR   I).
The expected utility of the entrepreneur is then equal to the project’s social value given V Cu’s
33signal, minus the expected proﬁt of V Cu under competition (denoted E(V Cu)), minus the rent
left to V Ce when su = H:
E(UE(^ 
u > ^ 







u > ^ 
e())+E(V Cu) < q(Hu)p(R+B) I. Therefore, V Cu can propose 
u
such that both he and the entrepreneur are better off negotiating than enforcing competition, and
the equilibrium candidate in which  > 0 and ^ 
u > ^ 
e() does not exist.
Although the second signal increases the value of the project, the entrepreneur has to abandon a
positive proﬁt to V Ce if he engages in non exclusive negotiation. As a consequence, there always
exists an offer at the ﬁrst stage, that grants the entrepreneur a strictly higher utility than what he
can obtain at the second stage. Terminating exclusivity cannot be an equilibrium strategy.

Proof of proposition 5
When the shopping around strategy is chosen, the expected utility of the entrepreneur is equal to
the total expected monetary proﬁts, minus the expected proﬁt of V Ce, plus the expected private




pR + pB) (11)
When the entrepreneur initiates exclusive talks, he obtains:
E(UE) = Pr(Hu)q(Hu)pB + Pr(Lu;He)q(Lu;He)pB: (12)




Pr(Hu)q(Hu)   Pr(He)q(He) + Pr(Lu;He)q(Lu;He)
: (13)

Proof of proposition 6
Recall that the expected proﬁt of V Cu is strictly positive and equal to Pr(Hu)(q(Hu)pR   I)
under exclusive talks, while it is zero when the entrepreneur shops around.






when the entrepreneur approaches both VCs simultaneously.







> Pr(He)Pr(LujHe)(q(He;Lu)pR   I):
Given that Pr(He)Pr(LujHe) = Pr(Lu;He), we obtain that expected proﬁts of V Ce are higher
in the shopping around strategy.

Proof of proposition 7
For a given offer, the expected proﬁt on investment (E(V CjI)) is given by E(V CjI) =
E(V C)
pV C(I) , where pV C(I) is the probability that V C’s offer is accepted, and where E(V C) is the
expected proﬁt on each offer. Note that total expected proﬁts are simply obtained by multiplying
E(V C) by the probability to make an offer.
In the "shopping around" strategy, only V Ce ﬁnances the entrepreneur at equilibrium. As a con-
sequence, we have :
E(V CejI) > E(V CujI) = 0:
35When the entrepreneur initiates exclusive negotiation, each offer is accepted with probability one
(pV Ce(I) = pV Cu(I) = 1) and each VC offers 
 = 0. Proﬁts on investment are then given by:
(V Cu) = q(Hu)pR   I and (V Ce) = q(He;Lu)pR   I.
(V Ce)   (V Cu) = [q(He;Lu)pR   I]   [q(Hu)pR   I] (14)
Equation (14) reduces to





(1   u)2 (15)
Equation (15) may be positive or negative, depending on parameter values.
Observe next that
@((V Ce) (V Cu))
@e > 0 and that 9 " =
(2u 1)u(1 u)
(1 u)2+u2 > 0 such that (V Ce) >
(V Cu) when e   u > ".

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